What is extraordinary about the NHS ransomeware attack is that it hasn’t happened before. This huge organisation is a Microsoft monoculture, the only variety being the degree to which the software is kept up to date. IT departments are seen as “back office” and are therefore at the front of the queue every time the politicians want to cut. The 24/7 NHS runs on 9-5 weekday IT support; updates are not applied for years if ever.
For example, at work:
- google warns me my browser is outdated
- the main patient administration system will only work in an outdated browser
- security certificates from the main pieces of software are not recognised so users have to dismiss dozens of security warnings each day and are in the habit of dismissing warnings
- there is still no universal end-to-end encrypted email
- there is a culture of communicating even trivia by attachments to email, fostering a “click to open” culture
A few years ago I had the opportunity to become involved with an open source, NHS sponsored, software project. While trying (failing) or get it taken up, I had to explain the head of IT what open source software was. He really didn’t know.
So now there will be a draconian managerialism response to the attack – deputy heads will roll – and the labour cost of doing anything will increase. But that’s all. Nothing real will change.